Net Neutrality, Prioritization and the Impact of Content Delivery Networks by Baake, Pio & Sudaric, Slobodan
Net Neutrality, Prioritization and the Impact
of Content Delivery Networks
Pio Baake (DIW Berlin)
Slobodan Sudaric (HU Berlin)
Discussion Paper No. 102
June 25, 2018
Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 | www.rationality-and-competition.de
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Spokesperson: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt, University of Munich, 80539 Munich, Germany
+49 (89) 2180 3405 | info@rationality-and-competition.de










We analyze competition between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) where con-
sumers demand heterogeneous content within two Quality-of-Service (QoS) regimes,
Net Neutrality and Paid Prioritization, and show that paid prioritization increases
the static efficiency compared to a neutral network. We also consider paid prioriti-
zation intermediated by Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). While the use of CDNs
is welfare neutral, it results in higher consumer prices for internet access. Regarding
incentives to invest in network capacity we show that discriminatory regimes lead to
higher incentives than the neutral regime as long as capacity is scarce, while investment
is highest in the presence of CDNs.
JEL–classification numbers: L13, L51, L96
Keywords: content delivery network, investment, net neutrality, prioritization
∗DIW Berlin, Mohrenstr. 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany, Email: pbaake@diw.de.
†HU Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany, Email: sudarics@hu-berlin.de.
We wish to thank Marc Bourreau, Philipp Dimakopoulos, Tianchi Li, Robert Somogyi, Roland
Strausz as well as two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank partici-
pants of the 2016 IODE workshop in Louvain-la-Neuve, 2016 EARIE conference in Lisbon and 2017 ITS
European conference in Passau. Financial support through the German Research Foundation (RTG 1659




This paper contributes on the ongoing debate on ‘net neutrality’ – a concept that broadly
requires that all internet traffic should be treated equally (Wu, 2003). One central as-
pect within the debate revolves around differentiation with respect to Quality-of-Service
(QoS), i.e. whether or not all content classes should face identical service quality within
the network. While opponents of net neutrality argue that QoS differentiation is part of
reasonable network management and should therefore be allowed if not encouraged, net
neutrality proponents argue that this benefits mainly network providers as it opens up
new revenue models, and picks a few winners amongst the landscape of content providers
(CPs). Indeed this ambivalence can be found e.g. in EU guidelines (EP and Council of
the EU, 2015; BEREC, 2016) where a neutral treatment of internet traffic appears as
a central pillar of the new regulation, while internet service providers (ISPs) may still
offer differentiated QoS under certain conditions.1 While there are various ways of QoS
alterations within the management of a network, we would like to focus on the practice
of ‘paid prioritization’ where CPs pay ISPs directly for prioritization of their content.
We also consider the impact of Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) such as Akamai or
Limelight. Instead of contracting with network operators directly, content providers can
contract with an intermediary, the CDN, which then delivers the traffic to the ISPs.2
The purpose of this paper is therefore to analyze how paid prioritization affects, firstly,
the static efficiency for a given network infrastructure, and secondly, the dynamic efficiency
regarding incentives for investment in network capacity. In a neutral regime ISPs are only
allowed to offer one quality level, i.e. all participants experience potential network conges-
tion to the same extent. In a paid prioritization regime ISPs can charge CPs for bypassing
1As long as there is no discrimination within content classes, differentiated QoS measures can be applied
to different content classes if they are considered to be ‘reasonable’. While traffic management measures
can not be put in place based on purely commercial considerations, the guidelines remain silent on pricing
of differentiated QoS in the case they are technologically reasonable. For further details we refer to BEREC
(2016).
2CDNs often have direct interconnection points with last-mile networks which can lead to higher traffic
quality when delivering content to consumers. However, this quality improvement is not seen as a violation
of the principle of net neutrality, as all traffic within the last-mile network is continued to be treated equally,
even though from a consumer point of view a quality differentiation takes place. For example, the Netflix-
Comcast dispute was not about offering priority lines for Netflix’s services, but rather about Comcast’s
decision to demand interconnection charges from CDNs with a large amount of outgoing data traffic
(caused by Netflix). See for example ‘Comcast vs. Netflix: Is this really about Net neutrality?’ (Retrieved
May 17,2018 from https://www.cnet.com/news/comcast-vs-netflix-is-this-really-about-net-neutrality).
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the network congestion by having access to a ‘priority lane’. In a CDN environment ISPs
offer access to their priority lanes to CDNs instead, which then resell the access to CPs.
This setup reflects the idea of capacity bottlenecks in the regional or last-mile segment
where congestion occurs because of high consumer demand (e.g. in legacy copper or coaxial
networks).
We present a two-sided market model where two symmetric ISPs compete for con-
sumers and CPs. Consumers are assumed to single-home, i.e. they purchase internet access
only once, while CPs are free to multi-home with respect to their QoS choice. Content
is differentiated with respect to connection quality sensitivity and quality levels are de-
rived from a M/M/1 queuing system, where the non-priority quality (‘best-effort’) always
remains free of charge, while the priority quality becomes a possible revenue source.
Using this framework, we show that the two regimes of QoS differentiation are wel-
fare superior to the neutral regime. As content is differentiated, a tiered quality regime
allocates priority to highly sensitive content classes while it leaves content classes with
low quality sensitivity in the waiting queue, resulting in a more efficient use of existing
network capacity. In particular we show that from a welfare perspective it is irrelevant
whether this is achieved by direct paid prioritization or through the use of a CDN. Differ-
ences emerge once we take into account strategic effects of the QoS regimes on competition
for consumers. Here we argue that QoS differentiation makes the consumer market more
elastic leading to lower consumer prices in regimes of QoS differentiation compared to the
neutral regime. In particular under paid prioritization consumer prices are lowest as here
a price increase on the user market has an additional negative effect on the CP market,
while this is not the case in a CDN environment. Lastly, we analyze unilateral incentives
to increase network capacity from a symmetric equilibrium perspective and show that as
long as network capacity is scarce, both discriminatory regimes lead to higher investment
in network capacity than the neutral regime, while investment is highest in the CDN case
irrespective of the initial capacity level.
Related literature
From a modeling perspective we build on the literature on competition in two-sided mar-
kets in general and applications in the telecommunications industry in particular. The
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general setup follows the competitive bottleneck idea in Armstrong (2006) in the sense
that we consider single-homing consumers and allow for multi-homing on the CP side.
Applications of a two-sided approach to telephone networks (Armstrong, 1998; Laffont
et al., 1998a,b) and to the internet industry (Laffont et al., 2003) can also already be
found in earlier work. The key difference is that we explicitly model network congestion
and resulting questions of QoS differentiation, while the early stream of literature largely
disregards questions of network quality.
This aspect is analyzed in detail in the younger but growing literature on net neu-
trality.3 Hermalin and Katz (2007) compare a neutral network where ISPs are restricted
to offer a single quality level as opposed to a discriminatory regime where ISPs can offer
multiple quality levels to CPs. They conclude with ambiguous welfare effects: offering a
single quality level drives some content types out of the market and provides an ineffi-
cient low quality level for other content types. However, CPs ‘in the middle’ are likely to
benefit from it. Economides and Hermalin (2012) expand on this result by explicitly mod-
eling bandwidth limits where different qualities could introduce welfare gains in light of
congested networks. Following a similar QoS approach, Economides and Hermalin (2015)
further show that net neutrality leads to lower investment incentives. Guo and Easley
(2016) consider QoS differentiation with respect to effective bandwidth and demonstrate
that net neutrality is beneficial for content innovation. Another stream of literature tackles
the congestion problem using a queuing approach. Choi and Kim (2010) and Cheng et al.
(2011) present a model where a monopoly ISP offers a prioritization service to two CPs.
This framework is extended by Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012) to a model with a continuum
of heterogeneous CPs. While Choi and Kim (2010) and Cheng et al. (2011) derive mixed
results regarding welfare and investment incentives, Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012) show
that a discriminatory regime is more efficient and provides higher investment incentives
in the long run. While we follow the same direction in terms of CP heterogeneity and the
use of queuing, our model differs substantially as we consider platform competition.
This aspect is captured to some extent by Economides and T̊ag (2012) and Njoroge
et al. (2013) where platform competition is considered but the congestion issue is ignored.
3Greenstein et al. (2016) provide an excellent overview over the inherent trade-offs of the net neutrality
debate as well as the associated literature.
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Choi et al. (2015) present a closely related model in terms of content differentiation and
analyze how the business model of CPs affects the optimal price-quality choice of plat-
forms. The key difference is that while we keep the business model fixed in our model,
qualities are endogenous in the sense that they are affected by congestion. Secondly, in
the case of competition the authors consider cooperative quality choice, while we consider
competition in the quality dimension through the platforms’ pricing strategies. Kourandi
et al. (2015) also consider the case of competing ISPs but focus on the aspect of internet
fragmentation when ISPs obtain exclusivity over content. The work most closely related to
our model is the paper by Bourreau et al. (2015) where competing ISPs offer queuing based
prioritization to differentiated CPs. The main difference from a modeling perspective is
how surplus is generated in the economy, as the authors consider an elastic number of CPs
and interpret the exclusion of CPs as decrease of content variety. In our model consumers’
utility depends on the connection quality of consumed content and not on variety per se.
One could therefore see our modeling setup as a combination of the models presented in
Choi et al. (2015) and Bourreau et al. (2015). Further, we additionally introduce CDNs
as intermediaries which are not considered in any of the previously mentioned papers.
In general the topic of CDNs has largely been disregarded in the net neutrality debate.
Hosanagar et al. (2008) study the optimal pricing policy of CDNs but do not perform
any welfare comparisons. This is done to some extent in Hau et al. (2011), where different
QoS regimes are analyzed in the market for internet interconnection. The overall model
differs substantially from ours and in particular the authors do not consider competition
between ISPs for consumers, which is a main driver for our results. Interestingly, however,
the authors also find that a CDN shifts rents away from consumers to ISPs, a result
which qualitatively reoccurs in our analysis, although the underlying mechanics differ. In
particular, our results show that CDNs soften competition for consumers compared to a
regime where CPs directly contract with ISPs.
Our analysis supports the results obtained by Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012) and Bour-
reau et al. (2015): a discriminatory regime is superior in terms of static efficiency and tends
to provide higher investment in network capacity. At the same time our work complements
the existing literature in terms of the role of CDNs. While total efficiency is identical to
paid prioritization, consumers face higher prices when CDNs are used. Regarding the on-
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going debate on net neutrality our results therefore suggest that if QoS differentiation is to
be allowed (see e.g. recent advances in the US), direct prioritization agreements between
CPs and ISPs should be preferred over the indirect contracting via CDNs from a (static)
consumer perspective, as they lead to lower consumer prices, while investment in network
infrastructure is highest in the presence of CDNs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents
equilibrium outcomes for the different QoS regimes. Section 4 compares the different out-
comes regarding efficiency and investment incentives. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We study different QoS regimes in a two-sided market setting where ISPs deliver content
from CPs on one market side to consumers on the other market side. CPs strike QoS deals
either with ISPs directly (section 3.1 and 3.2) or with a CDN in section 3.3.
Internet service providers: There are two identical ISPs i = 1, 2 located at the ends of
a Hotelling line (location λi = 0 for i = 1 and λi = 1 for i = 2). ISPs sell internet access to
consumers at price pi and make QoS offers (fi, qi) to CPs, such that in exchange for a fee fi
consumers in network i can be reached at quality qi. In the case of net neutrality the only
offer ISPs can make is of the form (0, qni ) where q
n
i denotes the best-effort quality in network
i, which is free of charge. This reflects the idea that there is ubiquitous interconnectivity
in the economy such that CPs can reach consumers of network i irrespective of whether
there is an existing agreement with the network. Under paid prioritization ISPs can offer
in addition to the free best-effort quality a prioritization service (fi, q
p
i ) with fi ≥ 0 where
qpi denotes the priority quality level in network i.
The quality levels qni and q
p
i are derived from a M/M/1 queuing model with an arrival








wpi without prioritization, (2)
where Ni ∈ [0, 1] denotes the mass of consumers connected to ISP i, Yi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
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mass of CPs who purchased prioritization in network i, and ki is the network capacity of
ISP i. Quality levels in network i are then defined as
qpi = 1− w
p
i with prioritization, (3)
qni = 1− w
n
i without prioritization. (4)
Further, we make the following assumption regarding network capacities such that quality
levels remain non-negative.
Assumption 1 Network capacities are sufficiently large ki ∈ (2,∞).
This assumption ensures that waiting times do not explode for low capacity levels such
that we have wpi , w
n




i ∈ (0, 1). Also this assumption implies that
each network could shoulder the whole traffic by itself such that there are not any purely






i ) = 0, i.e.
if capacities are large waiting times in all queues converge to zero and quality differences
disappear.
Content providers: There is a continuum of differentiated CPs with total mass normal-
ized to one. CPs are differentiated with respect to their quality sensitivity θ ∈ Θ ≡ [0, 1]
which we assume to be uniformly distributed. Low values of θ correspond to content-types
with low sensitivity with respect to transmission quality (e.g. e-mails) whereas high values
represent quality-sensitive services (e.g. live streaming).
We assume the CPs’ business model is entirely passive (e.g. ad-based) and that the
delivery of content of type θ at quality level q to one consumer generates advertisement
revenues r(θ, q) = θq such that θ measures the importance of quality for the revenue
generation. A CP of type θ decides whether to purchase prioritization (hθi = p) in network
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We can then define Pi = {θ ∈ Θ | h
θ
i = p} as the set of content types prioritizing in
network i and Yi =
∫
θ∈Pi
dθ as the total mass of prioritized content in network i.
Consumers: There is a continuum of differentiated consumers with total mass normal-
ized to one. Consumers have a uniformly distributed location x ∈ [0, 1] and obtain utility
v(θ, q) = θq from consuming one unit of content from a CP of type θ delivered with quality




v(θ, qni )dθ +
∫
θ∈Pi
v(θ, qpi )dθ (7)
and can be thought of as a summary statistic for the network quality of ISP i. Overall
utility ui(x) from connecting to network i is then given by
ui(x) = u+ Vi − pi − |λi − x| (8)
and depends on the aggregate utility from content consumption Vi, the internet access
price pi and the location of the consumer.
5 Lastly, u captures utility which is derived
from connecting to the internet but not covered by our CP model and is assumed to be
sufficiently high such that market coverage is ensured.
Timing In a first step, ISPs set consumer prices pi and (if allowed) prioritization fees
fi. Secondly, consumers decide which network to join and CPs decide in which network
to purchase prioritization (if applicable) simultaneously. The solution concept is sub-game
perfection.
4Note, in our model v(θ, q) = r(θ, q) which is a simplifying assumption. We could also allow for a setting
where consumers receive a fraction s of the surplus θqi and CPs the remaining fraction (1− s). Our results
would not change qualitatively.
5We omit the arguments of Vi where it does not lead to confusion.
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3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we present equilibrium outcomes for the three different QoS regimes which
we will refer to by the superscripts given in brackets: Net neutrality (n), Paid prioritization
(p) and Content Delivery Networks (c). Details of the formal analysis are delegated to
Appendix A and proofs can be found in Appendix B.
3.1 Net neutrality
In this section we consider the benchmark scenario of net neutrality. In this scenario ISPs
can not sell prioritization and their only source of revenue is selling internet access to
consumers, i.e. we have Pi = ∅ and therefore Yi = 0 in both networks. As the best-effort
quality level is free of charge, CPs will reach consumers of network i at quality level qni
such that we have hθ = (n, n) ∀ θ. Total profits from content delivery obtained by a CP
of type θ are then given by
π(θ, hθ) = θ (qn1N1 + q
n
2N2) (9)
with qni = 1− 1/(ki −Ni) for i = {1, 2}. Turning to consumers the aggregate utility from







Since there is only one quality level in the neutral regime all content types arrive at the
uniform quality level qi. The consumer market shares of both ISPs are then given by the
indifferent consumer x̂ : u1(x̂) = u2(x̂) on the Hotelling line.






[(V1 − p1)− (V2 − p2)] and N2 = 1− x̂. (11)
Note, that (11) defines Ni only implicitly as the quality levels q
n
i also depend on
the consumer market shares. We therefore make use of the implicit function theorem to
obtain market share reactions ∂Ni/∂pi. Details can be found in Appendix A. The first
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order conditions to the ISPs’ maximization problems
max
pi
Πi = piNi (12)





Note, that even though this is a very simple maximization problem it is not the stan-
dard Hotelling problem. The endogeneity of qni leads to less elastic market shares Ni.
Utilizing symmetry in network capacities ki = kj = k we obtain the unique symmetric
solution pn := argmaxpi Πi|pj=pn where
pn = 1 +
2
(2k − 1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−Ni/(∂Ni/∂pi)
. (14)
Equilibrium market shares are then given by Ni = Nj = 1/2. Regarding comparative
statics we see that ∂pn/∂k < 0, i.e. consumer prices are lower for higher (symmetric)
capacity levels. The reason is that higher capacity levels make consumer demand more
elastic ∂2Ni/∂pi∂k < 0. Consider the case where k is very large. Then congestion is
basically irrelevant and quality levels in both networks effectively do not depend on the
ISPs’ market shares, such that ISPs only compete in prices. If capacity is scarce the
congestion problem dampens consumers willingness to switch networks as by joining the
rival network the rival’s quality decreases. Hence, demand is less elastic and consumer
prices increase. The property ∂pn/∂k < 0 will reoccur throughout the analysis and we will
refer to it as ‘capacity effect’.
3.2 Paid prioritization
In this section we consider the case where ISPs directly offer CPs paid prioritization
agreements. The proposed offer consists of content delivery to all consumers in network
i at priority quality qpi in exchange for a fee fi, while content delivery at the best-effort
10
quality level qni remains free of charge.
6
CPs make the decision whether to purchase prioritization for each network separately.
The decision depends on how the profit of reaching consumers connected to ISP i at best-
effort quality qni compares to the profit under a prioritization agreement with access to
the priority quality qpi . By comparing the profit levels given in (5) we can pin down an







CPs will therefore engage in a prioritization contract if they offer sufficiently quality-
sensitive content θ ≥ θ̂i, and stick to the best-effort quality if their content type is insensi-
tive θ < θ̂i. The set of prioritizing CPs in network i is then given by Pi = [θ̂i, 1] such that
the mass of prioritized traffic in network i is given by Yi = 1 − θ̂i. Turning to consumers










and consists of prioritized (θ ≥ θ̂i) and non-prioritized (θ < θ̂i) content. The consumers’
decision which network to join is given as in (11) by pinning down an indifferent consumer.
The profit maximization problem of an ISP can then be written as
max
pi,fi
Πi = piNi + fiYi. (17)
Due to the endogeneity of the quality levels, we again apply the implicit function theorem
to obtain consumer market share reactions ∂Ni/∂pj , ∂Ni/∂fj and CP share reactions
∂Yi/∂pj , ∂Yi/∂fj for i, j = {1, 2}. Further we introduce the following intermediary result
which provides us assurance of an interior solution to the maximization problem.
Lemma 1 Each ISP has an incentive to offer prioritization.
Proof. See Appendix.
6As we consider unit demand the distinction between a linear per-consumer fee and a lump-sum fee to
reach all consumers in network i is irrelevant. We stick to the latter specification for reasons of conciseness.
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First, prioritization introduces additional revenue streams on the CP side of the mar-
ket. Secondly, compared to no prioritization the network’s overall quality Vi increases as
some highly sensitive content types now arrive at high quality, while the quality of the
remaining content types barely changes. This pushes more consumers into the network of-
fering prioritization which increases the ISP’s profit even further. As this argument holds
for each ISP irrespective of whether the other ISP offers prioritization or not, offering
prioritization is a strictly dominant strategy. Given Lemma 1 we can now focus on the















Comparing (18) to (13) we see that optimal consumer price setting now takes into account
the effect on the CP market, where an increase in prices reduces the number of consumers
and hence reduces the revenue from the prioritization business as it decreases the share
of prioritizing CPs. Going back to the definition of the indifferent content class in (15)
we see that there are two effects affecting the share of prioritizing CPs. First, there is
a direct effect when increasing consumer prices, as the share of consumers Ni decreases.
Secondly, the indifferent content class depends on the difference in quality levels qpi − q
n
i .
As a reduction in the number of consumers reduces the total traffic in the network and
hence the congestion problem, the difference in quality levels decreases when the number
of consumers goes down, pushing the indifferent content class upwards and hence reducing
the share of prioritizing CPs.7 In summary, introducing prioritization therefore restricts
the ability of ISPs to raise consumer prices.
The optimal prioritization fee similarly balances the revenue generation across both
market sides. While an increase in fees reduces the share of prioritizing CPs, the effect on
the consumer market is not necessarily monotone. Coming from a situation of no prioriti-
zation, a higher share of prioritized content increases utility from content consumption as
quality sensitive content arrives at high quality. However, if the share of prioritized content
is too large, the congestion externality imposed on the priority queue might outweigh the
7It is easy to verify that ∂(qpi − q
n
i )/∂Ni > 0.
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benefits of prioritizing additional content classes which would decrease overall network
quality.
Continuing with the analysis we again find a symmetric equilibrium such that (pp, fp) =
argmaxpi,fi Πi|pj=pp,fj=fp resulting in Yi = Yj = Y
p ≡ 1− θ̂p = 2k−ψ and Ni = Nj = 1/2
as well as ∂Ni/∂fi = 0 for i 6= j with equilibrium values
pp = 5−
(8k − 6)ψ










and fp = Y p
1






2k(2k − 1). Note that ∂Y p/∂k < 0 (or equivalently ∂θ̂p/∂k > 0), i.e. the
higher the capacity level in the market the lower share of prioritized content classes. If ca-
pacity levels rise, networks become less congested and the quality gain from prioritization
decreases.8 Therefore, only CPs with extremely sensitive content types opt for prioritiza-
tion. Regarding consumer prices we obtain ∂pp/∂k < 0 which is in line with the capacity
effect described in section 3.1. The effect of the quality level on prioritization fees is given
by ∂fp/∂k < 0 which reflects the decreasing advantage of prioritization if overall capac-
ity is large. Further, this effect prevails even in presence of an increased elasticity on the
consumer market such that standard platform logic would predict a price increase on the
CP market side.
Note that from equations (14) and (19) we can infer the equilibrium market share
elasticity ∂Ni/∂pi in both regimes. Comparing the two cases we see that the consumers’
reaction to price changes is stronger in a prioritization regime.9 The reason for this is
that introducing a priority queue already eases the congestion problem in the networks.
Therefore by switching to the rival network the overall network quality decreases less,
hence market shares are more elastic in a prioritization regime. We will refer to this effect
simply as ‘elasticity effect’. Note this effect is very similar to the capacity effect described
in section 3.1. However, while the capacity effect states that market shares become more
elastic when the capacity level k increases, the elasticity effect states that for a given level
of k market shares are more elastic in a prioritization regime.




i ) = 0.
9The comparison boils down to ψ > 2(2k − 1)2/(4k − 3) which is satisfied under Assumption 1.
13
Lastly, we get ∂Ni/∂fi = 0 in equilibrium. To gain intuition for this result consider
the case where coming from a neutral regime (fi prohibitively high) the prioritization fee
is reduced such that Yi > 0. This increases the revenue on the CP side and at the same
time increases the network’s quality which attracts more consumers. This ‘double benefit’
is exploited fully in equilibrium, resulting in ∂Ni/∂fi = 0.
3.3 Content Delivery Network
In this section we consider an alteration to the prioritization setup presented in section
3.2. In particular we introduce a Content Delivery Network (CDN) as an additional player
which serves as an intermediary between CPs and ISPs. The idea is that the CDN enters
an agreement with ISPs such that traffic coming from the CDN is prioritized, while traffic
not coming from the CDN remains unprioritized.10
For this we introduce an additional ‘offer stage’ at the beginning of the game. In the
offer stage the CDN publicly announces lump-sum transfers Fi ∈ R, which the ISPs can
either accept or reject.11 If ISP i accepts offer Fi, the CDN is free to set the prioritization
fee fi for reaching costumers in network i just like in section 3.2 while ISP i only sets
consumer prices pi. If ISP i rejects offer Fi, prioritization in network i is offered by ISP i
instead.12 In any case prices pi, pj and prioritization fees fi, fj are set simultaneously as
before. This setting resembles the industry practice, where ISPs and CDNs make long-
term infrastructure level decisions, while offers made to consumers and CPs are made once
those decisions are made.13
To avoid multiplicity of equilibria we apply the payoff dominance refinement (Harsanyi
and Selten, 1988) to the coordination game in the offer stage, such that in case there
10For simplicity reasons we abstract from any additional quality improvements due to the use of CDNs.
11One can alternatively consider a two-part tariff Ti = (ti, Fi) ∈ R
2 where ti is an additional linear fee.
It is clear that ti introduces a double marginalization inefficiency which would reduce the total obtainable
profit of the CDN. We therefore restrict our analysis to the case of ti = 0 which reduces the proposal to
the lump-sum fee Fi.
12We implicitly assume that ISPs commit to not offer prioritization themselves in case they accept the
offer such that the offer Fi can be seen as an exclusive dealing arrangement. Without commitment the
standard Bertrand argument would apply, as in particular the CDN would undercut any positive fee set
by the ISP.
13The fact that offers Fi are public is a simplifying assumption which allows us to focus on the induced
change in competition dynamics. If we consider private offers instead, existence of the presented equilibrium
remains unchanged.
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are multiple equilibria when deciding whether to accept offers Fi, we select the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium in terms of ISP profits.




Πc = fiYi + fjYj − Fi − Fj , i 6= j (20)
where Yi and Yj are obtained as in section 3.2 and Fi, Fj denote (sunk) lump-sum transfers
to both ISP i and j. ISPs in this case only compete on the consumer market:
max
pi
Πi = piNi + Fi, i = 1, 2 (21)
Market share reactions ∂Ni/∂pj , ∂Ni/∂fj as well as ∂Yi/∂pj , ∂Yi∂fj for i, j = {1, 2} are
again obtained as in (36) giving rise to first order conditions to maximization problems










, i 6= j. (22)
We can immediately see that the maximization problem of the ISPs now closely resem-
bles the maximization problem under the neutral regime. In particular ISPs now do not
internalize the negative effect of a price increase on the share of prioritized content as
they did in section 3.2. However, remember that there is a tiered queue on the content
market, such that the market share reaction differs compared to the neutral regime due to
the elasticity effect. The CDN on the other side now internalizes the effect of a fee setting
in market i on the share of prioritized content in network j while in section 3.2 the fee
setting internalized the effect on the consumer market share in network i.
Continuing with the analysis we again obtain a symmetric equilibrium (f c, f c) =
argmaxfi,fj Πc|pi=pj=pc and p
c = argmaxpi Πi|fi=fj=fc,pj=pc for i 6= j resulting in
Ni = Nj = 1/2 and Yi = Yj = Y
c ≡ 1 − θ̂c = 2k − ψ and ∂Yj/∂fi = 0. Equilibrium
15
values are given by
pc = 5−
(8k − 6)ψ




and f c = Y c
1






2k(2k − 1) as in section 3.2. It now remains to show that this sub-game is
actually reached, i.e. the CDN makes offers which are accepted by the ISPs.
Lemma 2 The optimal offer is symmetric Fi = Fj = F
c and is accepted by both ISPs in
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given Lemma 2 we know that the CDN prefers contracting with both ISPs compared
to contracting with only one ISP. Further, the proposed offers are accepted by the ISPs
such that the presented equilibrium outcome is indeed sub-game perfect which allows us
to compare derived equilibrium values to the previous QoS regimes. We immediately see
that f c = fp and Y c = Y p while pc 6= pp which gives rise to the following result.
Proposition 1 The use of CDNs is welfare-equivalent to paid prioritization.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that from a total welfare perspective it is irrelevant whether
prioritization is achieved by direct paid prioritization offers made by ISPs, or whether
prioritization is offered through the use of a CDN. In particular the CDN will pick pri-
oritization fees which are equivalent to the paid prioritization scenario, resulting in an
identical share of prioritized content classes.
Going back to the definition of the critical content class in (15), we can see that the
only effect fi has on Yj is via the consumer market share Nj . Now consider the case of fi, fj
being large such that Yi = Yj = 0 and start decreasing fi such that we obtain Yi > 0. This
increases the network quality Vi in network i and hence pulls consumers from network i
into network j, increasing the revenue obtained from network i. Now consider a decrease in
fj such that Yj > 0. Consumers are pulled away from network i into network j, decreasing
the revenue obtained from network i and increasing the revenue obtained from network j.
Given these ‘push-and-pull’ effects, it is optimal for the CDN to set its prioritization fees
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such that the marginal effect on the consumer market vanishes, resulting in ∂Ni/∂fi = 0
and thus ∂Yj/∂fi = 0, which in turn leads to identical equilibrium fees as in section 3.2.
We can also immediately see that pc > pp as the optimal consumer prices now do
not take into account the adverse revenue effect on the CP side ∂Yi/∂pi as is the case
under paid prioritization. Unsurprisingly, we therefore observe higher consumer prices in
the CDN case. As we consider a covered consumer market the total welfare is unaffected
by this price increase, resulting in Proposition 1.
4 Comparison
This section compares the different QoS regimes from section 3. In the first part we look
at profits and consumer surplus separately to gain a better understanding of the under-
lying dynamics before combining our results in a single welfare measure. The second part
compares incentives to invest in network capacities.
4.1 Welfare
We start this section by defining simplified surplus metrics for symmetric equilibrium
outcomes. First, remember that in our symmetric outcomes Ni = Nj = 1/2 while the
share of prioritized content is pinned down by an indifferent content class θ̂ such that
the share of prioritized content takes the form Yi = Yj = Y = 1 − θ̂. It turns out to
be helpful to denote equilibrium quality levels as functions of θ̂ such that we have qni =
qnj = q
n(θ̂), qpi = q
p
j = q
p(θ̂). Note, that in a regime of net neutrality we have Y = 0 or
equivalently θ̂ = θ̂n := 1. Starting with the definition of consumer utility (8) we can then
denote consumer surplus SC as a function of symmetric consumer prices p and a cutoff
level θ̂:
SC(p, θ̂) = 2
∫ 1/2
0













Similarly, we can define total CP industry profits SCP as a function of a cutoff content
class θ̂ and a symmetric prioritization fee f in the case of prioritization.14




V (θ̂)− 2f(1− θ̂) for θ̂ < 1
V (θ̂) for θ̂ = 1
(26)
Finally, we can define total ISP (incl. CDN in section 3.3) industry profits SISP as a
function of prices p, f and critical content class θ̂.




p+ 2f(1− θ̂) for θ̂ < 1
p for θ̂ = 1
(27)
Combining all three measures into a total surplus measure TS we obtain




We immediately see that the network quality V (θ̂) plays a central role and we therefore
introduce the following intermediate result which will become useful when we compare the
different QoS regimes.
Lemma 3 The network quality V (θ̂) is higher in a prioritization regime:
V (1) < V (θ̂), θ̂ ∈ (0, 1)
Proof. See Appendix.
To gain intuition for Lemma 3 it is helpful to consider the extreme case θ̂ = 1, i.e. no
prioritization and all traffic taking place in the best-effort queue. Marginally decreasing
θ̂ then implies that highly quality-sensitive content arrives at priority quality, while the
quality for all the remaining traffic remains effectively unchanged, i.e. overall network
quality increases. A similar argument can be made for the other extreme case θ̂ = 0, where
all content is ’prioritized’, i.e. again the entire traffic takes place in a single quality queue,
14In a prioritization regime CP industry profits are given by SCP (f, θ̂) =
∫ θ̂
0























dθ = V (θ̂)− 2f(1− θ̂) while in the neutral








2r (qn(1), θ) dθ = V (1).
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while for intermediate levels θ̂ ∈ (0, 1) content distributes across both queues and some
sensitive content classes arrive at priority quality. Hence V (θ̂) is high for intermediate
levels of θ̂. Starting with consumers we then obtain the following result by comparing
consumer surplus under the different QoS regimes.
Proposition 2 Consumers benefit from prioritization as consumer prices decline and net-
work quality increases. In particular we have:
i.) V (θ̂p) = V (θ̂c) > V (θ̂n)
ii.) pn > pc > pp
iii.) SC(p
p, θ̂p) > SC(p
c, θ̂c) > SC(p
n, θ̂n)
Proof. See Appendix.
Prioritization has two main benefits for consumers. First, it allocates existing capacity
more efficiently such that highly quality sensitive content arrives at priority quality, while
content classes for which transmission quality plays a minor role are put in a waiting
queue. This increases the total utility from content consumption. Secondly, prioritization
makes it harder for ISPs to raise consumer prices as the consumer market becomes more
elastic, and since losing consumers to the rival network has an additional negative effect
on the revenue obtained on the CP market side. The last effect is not present in the case of
CDNs as here ISPs do not internalize the negative effect on the CP side. However, in both
cases consumers benefit from prioritization. Turning to the content industry, the following
proposition summarizes the main finding.
Proposition 3 The content industry does not benefit from prioritization.
SCP (f
n, θ̂n) > SCP (f
p, θ̂p) = SCP (f
c, θ̂c)
Proof. See Appendix.
There are two main reasons why the content industry does not profit from prioriti-
zation. For content classes which are not prioritized θ < θ̂, the free best-effort quality
decreases as we have ∂qn(θ̂)/∂θ̂ > 0, resulting in lower profits for CPs with low quality
sensitivity. CPs who purchased prioritization now have their content delivered at higher
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quality, however, the content delivery is no longer free of charge. The content class which
is indifferent between prioritization and best-effort quality θ̂ is worse off under prioritiza-
tion, as the best-effort quality decreases compared to a neutral regime. Only those CPs
with very high quality sensitivity potentially benefit from prioritization. However, in total
the content industry is worse off under prioritization. When it comes to the comparison
between a paid prioritization regime and a CDN based model this result predicts that CPs
are indifferent between the two as the outcome is equivalent.
Proposition 4 ISPs do not benefit from prioritization.
SISP (p
n, fn, θ̂n) > SISP (p
c, f c, θ̂c) > SISP (p
p, fp, θ̂p) (29)
Proof. See Appendix.
Even though prioritization opens up new revenue streams on the CP side, the induced
competition dynamics on the consumer market leads to lower industry profits. Consumer
prices decrease as the consumer market becomes more elastic and losing consumers now
has additional negative effects on the CP side of the business. This reduction in revenue
outweighs any additional revenue which can be obtained from selling prioritization to CPs,
resulting in lower ISP industry profits under prioritization. In the case of CDNs the ability
to raise consumer prices is less restricted compared to the paid prioritization case result-
ing in higher industry profits in the presence of CDNs compared to paid prioritization.
However, ISPs would be better off if they would not introduce prioritization offers even if
they would be allowed to do so.
Corollary 1 ISPs face a prisoner’s dilemma when deciding whether to offer prioritization.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 4.
As ISPs have an unilateral incentive to introduce prioritization offers (see Lemma 1),
they end up in a situation where competition for consumers is strengthened to such an
extent, that the negative effect on the consumer market outweighs the additional revenues
made on the CP market side. This result supports the finding in Bourreau et al. (2015).
Delegating the prioritization business to a CDN can then be seen as a remedy to soften
competition on the consumer market.
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Proposition 5 Welfare is higher under prioritization
TS(θ̂p) = TS(θ̂c) > TS(θ̂n)
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3.
As prices are transfers from consumers to ISPs, and fees from CPs to ISPs / CDN, the
welfare comparison boils down to the aggregate network quality. Under a prioritization
regime the existing network capacity is allocated more efficiently, resulting in a higher
total surplus.
4.2 Investment incentives
In this section we want to shed light on how the different QoS regimes affect investment
in network infrastructure. For this we compare investment incentives from a symmetric
equilibrium perspective. The idea is that capacity investments are typically long-term
decisions such that the industry is in equilibrium before the next investment decisions
are made. We assume that investment costs for capacity expansion are identical in all
regimes and therefore restrict our analysis to the comparison of marginal profits gross of
investment costs. The changes of pi, fi, Ni and Yi with respect to ki are again obtained
by applying the implicit function theorem, while we evaluate all expressions at respective
equilibrium values which allows us to make use of the envelope theorem for simplification.
Detailed derivations can be found in Appendix A.



















 > 0. (30)
The marginal profit of capacity investment mainly depends on the direct effect ∂Ni/∂ki > 0
of investment in network quality and thereby attracting consumers, and the strategic effect
∂pj/∂ki < 0 of network j in order to recapture lost market share by decreasing prices.
The former effect outweighs the latter, such that the overall effect is positive, and we will
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refer to the overall effect simply as ‘consumer effect’.



































 > 0. (31)
The dynamics behind the consumer effect are identical as in the neutral regime but differ
in magnitude (see detailed discussion below). The main difference is that we now have
an additional effect on the CP market side which we will refer to as ‘CP effect’. We
again distinguish two different sub-effects: A direct effect ∂Yi/∂ki < 0 and a strategic
effect ∂pj/∂ki < 0. As a capacity increase eases the congestion problem, less CPs opt for
prioritization, resulting in a negative direct effect. Similar to the consumer effect network
j reacts by lowering consumer prices, reducing the market share of network i and thereby
making prioritization in network i even less attractive, resulting in a second negative
(strategic) effect. As the business model of prioritization relies on a congestion problem,
investment in capacity expansion directly reduces the obtainable profit from the CP side
of the market. In total the positive consumer effect, however, outweighs the negative CP
effect, resulting in positive investment incentives.
For the CDN case we need to take into account the effect of the investment decision on
the business relationship with the CDN. It turns out to be helpful to denote the lump-sum
transfer F c as a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the CDN profit where α := F c/Πc . The investment









































 > 0. (32)
We now observe three separate effects: a positive consumer effect, a negative CP effect
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and a positive ‘CDN effect’. The dynamics in the consumer effect are as before, however,
the CP effect now consists only of two direct effects. On the one hand a capacity increase
in network i reduces the congestion problem and hence the benefit from prioritization
∂Yi/∂ki < 0. On the other hand it also attracts consumers from network j to join network
i and makes thereby prioritization in network j less attractive ∂Yj/∂ki < 0, resulting
again in a negative CP effect in total. The CDN effect reflects the fact that as capacity
increases the ISP obtains a larger share of the CDN profits. This has mainly two reasons.
First, increasing capacity ki reduces CDN profits dΠc/dki < 0 (see CP effect). Secondly,
increasing capacity increases the outside option of an ISP, resulting in a higher share of
obtainable CDN profits and a positive CDN effect.15
In figure 1 we now illustrate the magnitude of the different effects for various levels of
initial symmetric network capacity k. Proposition 6 summarizes the main findings of the
illustrated results.
Figure 1: Comparison of investment incentives
15We refer to the proof of Proposition 6 for details.
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Proposition 6 Incentives to invest in network capacity are highest in the CDN case.
Paid prioritization leads to higher investment incentives than a neutral regime if capacity
is scarce k ≤ k.
Proof. See Appendix.
First, note that the consumer effect is positive in all regimes while the CP effect is
negative in the two prioritization regimes. In the CDN case there is an additional positive
CDN effect. Those effects, however, differ in magnitude.
Starting with the consumer effect we would first like to mention that the direct effect
∂Ni/∂ki is strongest in the neutral regime. Since a tiered quality scheme already reduces
the congestion problem, the marginal effect of capacity expansion is higher when the
congestion problem is severe, as in the single-queue (neutral) regime. This means, however,
that the strategic effect introduced by ∂pj/∂ki must be the driving force behind the ranking
in magnitude displayed in the top right graph of figure 1. As explained in section 3.2,
prioritization leads to a more elastic consumer market. Hence, the market share reaction
with respect to rival’s prices ∂Ni/∂pj is more strongly pronounced in the prioritization
regimes. For the same reason, however, the strategic response by ISP j to an increase
in capacity ki is less pronounced in the prioritization regimes. As the consumer market
share is more elastic, prices pj are decreased to a lower extent than in the neutral regime.
The strategic effect combined with a more elastic consumer market results in a stronger
consumer effect in the prioritization regimes.
The CP effect is negative in both prioritization cases, however, their composition dif-
fers. While under paid prioritization only the direct effect on the proprietary network
∂Yi/∂ki < 0 is taken into account, in the CDN solution direct effects of both networks
are taken into account. The main driver for the difference in magnitude is, however, the
weighting factor α in the CDN case, such that in a CDN environment ISPs do not fully
internalize the negative effect on the CP market side when deciding on investment in net-
work capacity. In addition to the less pronounced CP effect, ISPs obtain an additional
positive CDN effect resulting in highest total marginal profits from capacity investment.
The comparison between the neutral and the paid prioritization regime depends on
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initial capacity levels.16 If capacity is scarce k ≤ k the stronger consumer effect in the
discriminatory regime dominates the neutral regime even in light of the negative CP effect.
If capacity is abundant k > k on the other hand, consumer effects are virtually identical
as high overall capacity makes prioritization irrelevant such that the negative CP effect
prevails yielding higher investment incentives in the neutral regime. In light of existing
QoS differentiation measures and global efforts to incentivize broadband investment, we
consider the case of scarcity to be more relevant.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed equilibrium outcomes under different QoS practices and showed that discrim-
inatory regimes are superior in terms of static efficiency as they allocate existing capacity
more efficiently while at the same time competition for consumers is strengthened, result-
ing in lower consumer prices and higher network quality in both discriminatory regimes
compared to a neutral regime. The extent to which consumers benefit, however, depends
on the way how prioritization is achieved. While prices are lowest under paid prioritiza-
tion, consumer prices increase with the use of CDNs as ISPs lack the additional incentive
to attract consumers to make prioritization more valuable.
Regarding investment incentives we showed that both discriminatory regimes lead to
higher investment in network capacity than the neutral regime as long as capacity is scarce,
while investment is highest in a CDN environment irrespective of the initial capacity level.
Under paid prioritization marginal profits obtained from the consumer market side are
higher than in the neutral regime, while marginal profits obtained from the CP side are
negative as capacity expansion makes prioritization less valuable. In a CDN scenario this
detrimental effect on the CP side is not fully internalized while at the same time ISPs
are able to capture a larger fraction of CDN profits when network capacity is expanded,
resulting in high investment incentives.
We would like to mainly draw two policy conclusions where the first is driven by our
efficiency result. As long as content is heterogeneous and network capacity is scarce, a
tiered-quality scheme increases efficiency. This result is not driven by the assumption that
16The critical capacity level is given by k ≈ 6.45. Details can be found in the proof of Proposition 6.
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total demand on the consumer market is inelastic, as a discriminatory regime simultane-
ously reduces consumer prices. Also, since the best-effort quality remains free of charge
no CPs are excluded from the market. For the second conclusion one should note that the
general debate on net neutrality tends to focus on ISP practices, while the use of CDNs
is barely mentioned. Our results suggest that while the outcome with CDNs is welfare
equivalent to the classical paid prioritization, consumer surplus is lower in the presence
of CDNs due to higher prices. Focusing on static efficiency and having consumer welfare
in mind, a regime of paid prioritization is therefore to be preferred. If the primary policy
goal is, however, investment in network infrastructure then our results suggest that a CDN
environment is to be preferred over paid prioritization.
We would also like to point out limitations of our analysis and where future research
could be headed. First, we implicitly assume that from a technical perspective contracting
with a CDN is equivalent to direct prioritization between ISPs and CPs. Here, a more
nuanced analysis could refine the comparison with respect to efficiency. Also, we modeled
the contractual relationship between ISPs and CDNs in rather general way. Here, industry
specific payment structures (access pricing, etc.) could provide further insights. Lastly,






For the consumer market share we define an ancillary equation
∆N = N1 − x̂ (33)
where x̂ denotes the indifferent consumer on the Hotelling line as in (11). To obtain market share
reactions ∂Ni/∂pi we then totally differentiate ∆N = 0 with respect to consumer prices pi while








In the case of a prioritization regime we additionally define ancillary equations for the share
of prioritized content:




, i = {1, 2}. (35)
Reactions with respect to consumer prices ∂Yi/∂pj , ∂Ni/∂pj and prioritization fees
∂Yi/∂fj , ∂Ni/∂fj for i, j = {1, 2} are then obtained by totally differentiating equations ∆N = 0,























where ∆Z = {∆N ,∆Yi ,∆Yj} and i, j = {1, 2}. Market share reactions with respect to prioritization
fees ∂Yi/∂fj , ∂Ni/∂fj can be obtained by an equivalent procedure.
Investment incentives
First we outline how we obtain reactions ∂Nj/∂ki, ∂Yj/∂ki, ∂pj/∂ki and ∂fj/∂ki for j = {1, 2}.
We will demonstrate the procedure in the paid prioritization case as it can easily be adjusted to
yield the reactions in the other regimes. We make extensive use of the implicit function theorem
by totally differentiating the first order conditions of ISPs i and j as well as the ancillary equations
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∆N = 0, ∆Yi = 0 and ∆Yj = 0 with respect to ki. The result is the following system of equations





































































We now turn to the definition of investment incentives. Starting with the neutral regime,


























Imposing symmetry and evaluating at equilibrium values pi = pj = p
n allows us to further




























































































Imposing symmetry ki = kj = k, evaluating at equilibrium values pi = pj = p
p, fi = fj = f
p, and

































































Using Π̃i := Πi + αΠc with Πi = piNi, Πc = fiYi + fjYj and α = F




















































































































Evaluating at equilibrium values pi = pj = p
c, fi = fj = f
c for the symmetric case ki = kj = k






















































































































































Finally, using ∂Yi/∂pi = −∂Yj/∂pi for i 6= j we obtain the final simplified form. Furthermore,


























where dΠci/dki and dΠ
c
c/dki are derived above, while dΠ
A
i /dki is obtained precisely as in (37) and
(38) applied to the asymmetric game structure outlined in the proof of Lemma 2.
B Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 1


















where x̂ denotes the indifferent consumer obtained as in (11). Hence, decreasing f i and thus offering
prioritization would lead to higher profits Πi.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We consider three different sub-game outcomes: a symmetric outcome where both ISPs
contract with the CDN, an asymmetric outcome where only one ISP contracts with the CDN and
the case where no ISP contracts with the CDN. The last case leads to zero profits for the CDN
such that it suffices to show that profits in the other two cases are weakly positive to exclude this
case.
To ease notation let Πcc = 2f
cY c and Πci = p
c/2 denote the equilibrium profits of the sub-
game outlined in section 3.3, and Πpi = p
p/2 + fpY p be the equilibrium ISP profit from section
3.2. Further consider the following asymmetric game where ISP j delegates prioritization to the
CDN, while ISP i does not contract with the CDN. As the lump-sum transfers do not affect the







j ) by following the same steps as outlined in section 3.3 such that
(pAi , f
A
i ) := argmax
pi,fi








ΠAc = fjYj |pi=pAi ,pj=pAj ,fi=fAi
. (48)
30






















































(−2k − 3NAi + 3)k
2
(NAi − 1)



















and Y Aj = 1−
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Starting with the symmetric outcome outlined in section 3.3, an ISP will not deviate from the
acceptance of an offer F c if Πci +F
c ≥ ΠAi such that the optimal offer from the point of view of an
CDN is given by F c = ΠAi − Π
c
i . Also, the CDN’s participation constraint must be satisfied such





i ≥ 0 (55)
for the existence of an offer F c which is accepted by both ISPs.
Turning to the asymmetric case we need acceptance of an offer F̂ such that ΠAj + F̂ ≥ Π
p
i
where F̂ = Πpi − Π
A
j is the lowest offer accepted by one ISP, while the offer to the other ISP can
simply be set to −∞ to make sure that only one ISP contracts with the CDN. Similarly, we need







i ≥ 0. (56)
In order for the symmetric case to be sub-game perfect we additionally require that the achiev-
able payoff from contracting with both ISPs is higher than in the asymmetric case such that











j ≥ 0. (57)
Conditions (55) - (57) are sufficient to prove existence of symmetric fees F c which are accepted
by both ISPs and satisfy the participation constraint of the CDN, and furthermore these condi-
tions assure that the symmetric outcome is preferred to the asymmetric case, assuring that the
equilibrium of the sub-game characterized in section 3.3 is indeed sub-game perfect. As all three
conditions depend on the asymmetric solution, we address the implicit definition of NAi in (54)
by evaluating equilibrium payoffs ΠAc ,Π
A and ΠAj for a given level k at the root to ∆NA = 0. We
can then perform numerical analysis for arbitrary values of k to verify that all three conditions are
satisfied. An illustration of the numerical analysis can be seen in the following figure where ‘sym’
refers to the LHS of (55), ‘asym’ to the LHS of (56) and ‘comp’ to the LHS of (57).
Figure 2: Illustration of conditions (55)-(57)
Following the same procedure one can verify that for given offers Fi = Fj = F
c there also
exists the reject/reject equilibrium in the offer stage which leads to payoffs Πpi for both ISPs. This
equilibrium is payoff dominated by the accept/accept equilibrium and therefore is subject to our
refinement.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. This result follows from the definition of V (θ̂) in (25). After basic simplifications we obtain
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V (θ̂) = 3/2− θ̂/(2k−1)−2k/(2k− (1− θ̂)) and V (1) = (2k−3)/(4k−2). Comparing V (θ̂) > V (1)
then reduces to (1− θ̂) > 0, which is satisfied for θ̂ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. As the consumer market is inelastic, the equivalence follows directly from θ̂c = θ̂p.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The result in i.) follows from Lemma 3. For ii.) we rearrange pn > pc to ψ > (8k2 − 8k +
1)/(4k− 3). Squaring both sides and basic simplification steps lead to (4k− 3)2(4k2 − 2k− 1) > 0
which is true by Assumption 1. For pc > pp we immediately see that pc − pp = fp4k/(2k− 1) > 0.
Point iii.) follows directly from i.) and ii.).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The inequality SCP (f
p, θ̂p) = SCP (f
c, θ̂c) < SCP (f
n, θ̂n) reduces to 2θ̂c = 2θ̂p < 1. As
∂θ̂p/∂k = ∂θ̂c/∂k > 0 it follows from limk→∞ θ̂
p = 1/2 that 2θ̂p = 2θ̂c < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First note that SISP (p
c, f c, θ̂c) > SISP (p
p, fp, θ̂p) follows from the proof of Proposition
2 as it boils down to the difference in consumer prices. The second inequality SISP (p
n, fn, θ̂n) >
SISP (p
c, f c, θ̂c) can be rearranged to 2k(1 + 12k2 + 5ψ + ψ2) < ψ2 + 4k2(5 + 4ψ). Substituting
ψ2 = 2k(2k − 1) and rearranging yields (16k2 − 14k + 2)/(8k − 5) < ψ. Squaring both sides and
rearranging yields (5− 8k)2(3k − 2) > 0, which is true.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3 and Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof.
Following the procedure outlined in Appendix A we obtain closed form solutions for investment
incentives in all three QoS regimes. In the case of net neutrality and paid prioritization the invest-
ment incentives only depend on the initial symmetric capacity level k. As investment incentives in
the CDN case partly depend on the asymmetric solution outlined in the proof of Lemma 2), we
obtain a final form depending on k and an asymmetric market share NAi which is implicitly defined
by ∆NA = 0 in (54). We denote investment incentives in the three regimes therefore as κ
n(k), κp(k)
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and κc(k,NAi ) but refrain from stating explicit expressions at this point. An implementation in
the Wolfram Mathematica environment is available on request.
Comparing κn(k) and κp(k) reveals a critical level k ≈ 6.45 such that κn(k) ≤ κp(k) for k ≤ k
and κn(k) > κp(k) for k > k. For the comparison to the CDN case we rely on a numerical approach
where we evaluate κc(k,NAi )) for a given level k at the root N
A
i to ∆NA = 0. The performed
analysis reveals κc(k,NAi ) > κ
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